Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 6
Issue 1 Fall 1972

Article 7

1972

The "Polaroid Experiment" in South Africa--A Progress Report
Beryl Unterhalter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Beryl Unterhalter, The "Polaroid Experiment" in South Africa--A Progress Report, 6 Vanderbilt Law Review
109 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol6/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

THE "POLAROID EXPERIMENT" IN SOUTH AFRICAA PROGRESS REPORT
Beryl Unterhalter*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The business activities of the Polaroid Company in South Africa
came under attack in October of 1970, when a small group of Polaroid
workers who called themselves the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers'
Movement received wide publicity for their protests concerning an
alleged anomaly in the company's annual report. According to the
Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement, the report, while alluding
to the company's role in combating racism and in providing equal
opportunities for all employees, described its expanding field of
operations and increased profits in South Africa, a country in which
racial discrimination is widespread. The Movement further pointed out
that part of the Polaroid profit in South Africa was earned from the
sale of photo-identification units to the South African Army, Air
Force and Non-European Affairs Department. The sale of these units
to the last-mentioned group constituted the most serious indictment
of the company's policies because the equipment was being used by
the department to photograph Black South Africans for the much
hated "reference" books or "passbooks," which control the movements of Blacks into urban areas in the Republic of South Africa. If a
Black is without one of these documents he is subject to imprisonment, a fine, or deportation from the urban area in which he was
found.' A further criticism of the Polaroid Company made by the
Movement concerned alleged racially discriminatory employment
practices by Frank and Hirsch Pty. Limited, the South African
company that is the exclusive distributor of Polaroid products in
South Africa.
The Polaroid Company proved sensitive to these criticisms, particularly when the Movement suggested an American boycott of the
company2 after reportedly demanding that Polaroid disengage com* Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg, South Africa.
1. According to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of South African
Police, 621,380 Blacks were sent for trial under the laws and regulations relating
to the production of documents between July 1, 1969 and June 30, 1970.
2. An advertisement that appeared in a number of leading American
newspapers illustrates this point. Under the heading "What's Polaroid doing in
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pletely from South Africa "since all United States companies doing
business there reinforce the system of that country."' 3 Polaroid
announced that the sale of identity systems and all photographic
equipment to departments of the South African Government would
be discontinued. 4 Of greater importance for the Black industrial
worker in the Republic was Polaroid's decision to send a four-man
team (two of whom were Blacks) to South Africa to study the
situation. The result of this investigation was an announcement in
January of 1971 that the Polaroid Company would not disengage
from South Africa but would embark on what has come to be called
the "Polaroid Experiment"-a one year scheme for the improvement
of the wages and status of all Black workers employed by Polaroid's
South African distributor, Frank and Hirsch Pty. Limited. Before
examining the features of the "Polaroid Experiment" and before
evaluating its first year, it would be appropriate to establish the social,
economic and legal backgrounds against which this plan was conceived
and implemented.
II.

DOMINATION THROUGH LEGISLATION

Adam' aptly summarizes the South African situation when he says
that "the South African Whites, who at present determine the racial
policies of their country, have almost perfected their domination over
the non-White labour potential, and they will continue to do this in
their own interests." He emphasizes that the present system is not
"fumbling towards its end," and he describes the Whites as "effective
technocrats who are establishing an unshakeable oligarchy in a society
where the wealth of an advanced industrialization in the hands of a
few Whites coexists with the relative deprivation of the non-Whites."
A.

The Legal Framework

The primary means by which the South African Whites effect their
racial policies is a group of laws regulating labor practices and wage
scales. Among the most important of these laws is the Industrial
Conciliation Act No. 28 of 1956, which creates machinery for
South Africa?", the following appeared: "Recently a group who called themselves
revolutionaries have demanded that we stop doing business with our customers in
South Africa.... Why was Polaroid chosen to be the first company to face
pressure about business in South Africa? Perhaps because the revolutionaries
thought we would take the subject seriously. They were right. We do."

3.

RAMPARTS,

Sept. 11, 1972, at 48.

4. PolaroidNewsletter, Feb. 12, 1971.
5. H. ADAM, MODERNIZING RACIAL

DOMINATION

181 (1971).
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collective bargaining about wages and conditions of employment by
means of industrial councils. These councils consist of representatives
of employers' organizations and trade unions that are registered bodies
in terms of the Act. Trade unions for Black workers, however, may
not be so registered. Therefore Black workers are not represented on
the industrial councils and, consequently, have no say concerning
wages payable to them, which are established in the industrial
agreements.6 If the Minister of Labour is satisfied with the scale of
wages and the conditions of work proposed for Black workers, he will
promulgate these, but. he does not consult Black trade unions before
doing so. Again, if industrial disputes arise, the industrial council
makes the first attempt at settlement, but if the matter concerns Black
workers, they may not be represented by their trade union officials in
discussions with employers. Thus, while Black trade unions are not
illegal, the fact that there are only thirteen such unions attests to their
impotence.
The Industrial Conciliation Act also controls the reservation of
skilled work for specific race groups. An industrial tribunal makes
recommendations to the Minister of Labour and he may then publish
a determination, the effect of which is to permit the employment of
members of one race group for the performance of only certain types
of work. For example, various tasks in the building industry may be
undertaken only by White artisans, unless the Minister grants an
exemption for certain areas and periods in special circumstances. This
is only one example of many such determinations. One authority has
concluded:
whereas on paper, job reservation can be applied for the protection of any
race... determinations will be designed to afford the White group another
legal barrier against non-White encroachment, thus further preventing the7
non-White from rising to higher and more responsible positions in industry.
When an industry is not governed by an Industrial Council, the
wages for that industry are laid down by a Wage Board under the
terms of the Wage Act No. 5 of 1957. The Board hears information
from employers and workers, and representatives of Black trade
6. Apart from the law, the attitude of many White workers is that they will
not permit the employer to allow a Black worker to perform skilled work even if
the high wage paid to the White worker is offered to the Black worker. In order to
avoid disputes with White workers the employer acquiesces, and thus the Black
worker is excluded from remunerative skilled work even when no determination
of an industrial tribunal operates.
7. G. DOXEY, THE INDUSTRIAL COLOuR BAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
143 (1961).
Vol. 6-No. 1
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unions can make submissions. Wage determinations are then made and
operate until they are revoked or amended. In recent years there has
been considerable criticism of the Boards for allowing wage determinations to continue for many years before they are updated. A recent
article by Hume' concluded that while White wage increases were
perpetually inflationary, Black wage increases were almost never
inflationary. 9
The right to strike is denied to Blacks by the Bantu Labour
(Settlement of Disputes) Act No. 48 of 1953, which also establishes
statutory works committees for Blacks. Section 7 of the Act provides
that whenever in any establishment there are employed not less than
twenty employees and such employees advise their employer that they
are desirous of electing a works committee, the necessary arrangements for the establishment of such a committee must be made. The
committee must function under the chairmanship of a local official of
the Department of Labour. In practice, few of these committees have
been established. '0 According to Doxey, I' Black workers find the
Labour Department officials more sympathetic to the views of the
employers than to those of the workers, and Black workers allege
intimidation and the threat of removal from the urban area if they
voice complaints.
Although there is no explicit provision in the Apprenticeship Act
No. 37 of 1944 that prohibits Black workers from being apprenticed
and from receiving training for a skilled trade, there are several factors
that, in fact, prevent such training. The first obstacle is the minimum
educational standard required-one that very many Black children
cannot attain in the absence of free compulsory education. The
second difficulty is the hostile attitude of many White workers to the
training of non-Whites as apprentices. An additional barrier in the
mining industry is the Mines and Works Act No. 27 of 1956, which
forbids the performance of certain skilled mining work by Blacks.
Finally, there is the Bantu Urban Areas Consolidation Act No. 25 of
1945, which regulates the entry of Blacks into the towns and, together
with the Bantu Labour Act No. 67 of 1964, channels the flow of
workers. In effect, these two laws buttress the system of migratory
8. Hume, Notes on South African Wage Movements, SOUTH AFRICAN
J. EcON. 240 (Sept., 1970).
9. It should be noted that there is no wage regulating machinery for farming
and domestic service.
10. Only 18 such works committees were functioning in 1971 according to a
field officer of the Institute of Race Relations. Trade Unions Special Report,
Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), Aug. 18, 1972.
11. G. DoxEY, supra note 7, at 152.
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labor and assist in maintaining the artificial shortage of manpower for
industry. 12
B. The Socio-Economic Background
A logical assessment of the socio-economic conditions existing in
South Africa at the time Polaroid embarked upon its experiment begins with a brief examination of the Poverty Datum Lines (PDL) for
Black families living in the urban areas of the Republic. The PDL is
calculated by estimating monthly expenditures for an average family
of five persons at the lowest current prices for rent, food, fuel,
lighting, clothing and transportation. It is a bare minimum standard
making no allowances for items such as school fees, medical and
dental care, insurance, recreational needs, taxation or contributions to
churches. A precise PDL will always be a matter of debate, but in
Johannesburg, the largest industrial city of the Republic, three
minimum monthly budgets published during 1971-72 gave similar
estimates of between R70 and R80 per month for Black families of
five persons. 13 It is recognized that the PDL is not an adequate living
wage and that a household's income should be at least 1.5 times the
PDL to realize a minimum effective income level (MEL). On even the
lowest of the PDL's of R70 per month the minimum effective level
would be R101 per month.
The depressed state of Black wages in manufacturing and construction industries is confirmed by recent figures published by the South
African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of South
Africa. 4 This report indicates that Black earnings are approximately
25 per cent of White. In the mining industry, Anglo American
Corporation, the largest of the mining companies, is reported to pay
Black miners an average wage of R21.84 per month, to which must be
added the value of free food, accommodations and medical services
that is variously estimated to be the equivalent of an additional R16
to R25 per month. The average monthly pay of a White miner is
12. It should be noted that the dates of the Acts referred to are those of the
Consolidation Acts--the original legislation with similar principles became law
many years ago, e.g., the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924, the Bantu Urban
Areas Act in 1923, and the Mines and Works Act in 1911.
13. Poverty Datum Line: R70.82 (S. A. Institute of Race Relations); R75.80
(Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce); R76.76 (Johannesburg Non-European
Affairs Department). Financial Mail, July 7, 1972. One rand is the equivalent of
$1.23 at current exchange rates.
14. POWER, PRIVILEGE AND POVERTY, REPORT OF THE SPROCAS
EcONOMIC COMMISSION
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21 (Johannesburg, 1972).
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reported to be R360 per month. ' s A recent article in the Financial
Mail 1 6 suggested that this gap, which can be called the skilled-unskilled wage ratio, is presently 5.7:1.11 It is likely to increase,
notwithstanding the beneficial effects of individual wage increases
paid by American and other firms, because of the shortage of White
labor that is endemic to South Africa. This shortage leads to a steady
increase in White wages as employers find themselves in competition
for the limited number of skilled White workers available. This
situation exists because of the labor laws and practices in the Republic
mentioned earlier, which preclude Blacks from working in most skilled
categories of work."8
It would seem from this evidence that unless American companies
are paying a minimum wage of approximately R100 per month,
workers are living in poverty. This is particularly true since Black
families are rarely as small as the five persons for whom the PDL is
calculated.
A final consideration among these socio-economic conditions is the
racial composition of the South African urban population. According
to the 1970 census of the Republic, the number and percentage of
each race group living in the urban areas was as follows:' 9

Race Group

Number in urban
areas

White
Colored
Asians
Blacks

3,257,805
1,494,490
538,536
4,989,371

TOTAL

10,280,202

Percentage in
urban areas

Total population
in the Republic

86.84
74.04
86.80
33.13

3,751,328
2,018,453
620,436
15,057,952
21,448,169

15. Johannesburg Sunday Times, Aug. 15, 1971.
16. Financial Mail, May 26, 1971.
17. It is of interest to compare the South African skilled-unskilled wage ratio
with that of other countries. According to the article quoted in note 16 supra, it is
less than 1.5:1 in the U.S.A. and Canada and 1.25:1 in Western Europe.
18. For a full discussion of the operation of these laws the reader is referred
to G. DOXEY, supra note 7.
19. M. Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1971 at 59
(published by South African Institute of Race Relations) (Jan., 1972).
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From this table it can be seen that a third of the Black population is in
the urban areas, although it should be noted that not all Black workers
are employed in industry or commerce. A substantial number, for
example, are employed in domestic service.
III.

THE POLAROID EXPERIMENT

The first year of the experiment has ended and it has now been
extended for an additional year. Polaroid will continue to distribute
its products in South Africa through Frank and Hirsch, and each year
applications for extensions of this distributorship agreement will be
submitted to the Polaroid company. 20
Since the commencement of the Polaroid Experiment, there have
been increased efforts not only to increase Black wages considerably,
but also to upgrade Black employment opportunities. The present
situation is that no Black employee of Frank and Hirsch begins work
at a wage below R70 per month. After one year of work his minimum
wage is increased to R80 per month. The average wage paid to Black
employees in 1972 is R116 per month. Moreover, while 69 per cent of
the Black staff earned between R70-R130 in 1972, 31 per cent of the
staff earned more than R130 per month. These figures evidence the
upgrading of the quality of positions available to Black employees. 21
20. For this information, as well as for the information concerning wages and
employment practices in Frank and Hirsch Pty. Ltd., the writer is indebted to the
company's managing director, Mr. Helmut Hirsch.
21. The following table summarizes the improvements in wages and status of
the Black staff of Frank and Hirsch Pty. Ltd.
Minimum monthly pay for
employees with one years
service has increased by
Average Salary has
increased by

%

1970

1971

1972

46%

R56

R70

R82

37%

R84.41

R101.62

R115.97

123%

22

37

49 men

Number of employees in
the highest pay category

(Over R130) has
increased by
Number of employees in
the lowest pay category

(Under R70) has
decreased by
100%
98
39
158 men
Frank and Hirsch Pty. Ltd. has always been considered an "enlightened"
employer. For example, its Black staff has had a works committee for the last
seven years. Blacks have always worked in certain clerical and supervisory
positions, and pensions and schemes were available to all workers.
Vol. 6-No. 1
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In addition to these wage increases, the following fringe benefits were
made available to Black workers: (i) a bursary fund for the
dependents of employees; (ii) a pension fund; (iii) free loans of up
to R700 to employees for the purchase of capital items; (iv) free
consultations with a house doctor; (v) free canteen services.
While it is against government policy in the Republic for Blacks to
supervise Whites, Frank and Hirsch now has eight Black supervisors
and there are departments staffed and supervised entirely by Blacks.
The managing director reports no friction between Black and White
staff members.2 2 The general experience has been that the upgrading
of Black occupations has engendered a new respect for Black employees in the company.
An especially important feature of Polaroid's experiment was its
decision to devote a portion of the company's profits each year to the
improvement of educational facilities for Blacks. An annual sum of
50,000 dollars has been allocated to a special trust fund known as the
American South African Study and Educational Trust (ASSET). It
provides bursaries for Black scholars, teachers and university students
and in 1973 will also provide bursary assistance for the first three
Blacks to study at the School of Business Administration of the
University of the Witwatersrand. ASSET is controlled by a racially
mixed Board of Trustees and is administered by the South African
Institute of Race Relations. In 1972 the Pepsi-Cola Company donated
50,000 dollars to this trust, and there is a possibility that further
donations will be made by American companies through either this or
other trust funds. There is little doubt that the promotion of Black
education is crucial to the advancement of the Black population of the
Republic, and donations by American companies can prove very
effective. Black South African school children, unlike White children,
must pay for their own education and books. In the primary classes
payments are from R9 to R16 per annum and in the secondary or high
schools from R25 to R37 per annum.2 3 While these amounts appear
insignificant, they are high when considered in relation to wages. A
decision to contribute money to Black education, if carried out by a
substantial number of American companies, could be an effective
method of creating educational opportunities for Black children in a
country where only 0.36 per cent of the Black school population are
in senior secondary classes, and the majority of the school population
(68.76 per cent) drop out of school after only four years of
elementary schooling. Furthermore, much could be accomplished by

22. Frank and Hirsch has 300 workers, of whom half are Black.
23. Horrell, supra note 19, at 257.
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giving bursary assistance to Black teachers to improve their qualifications. Only 1.5 per cent of these teachers have a university degree and
only 10 per cent have themselves completed high school.24 Assistance
to Black university students is also necessary; there are only 5,407
Blacks enrolled at South African universities as compared with 77,221
25
Whites.
Another beneficial effect of the Polaroid Experiment has been the
increased concern among other American firms in the Republic about
the wages and working conditions of Black employees. The South
African Institute of Race Relations (an independent nonprofit
organization) reports that since the Polaroid controversy it has been
inundated with requests for information about Black wages and
working conditions, as well as for copies of its memorandum dealing
with the problems of United States corporate investment in the
Republic of South Africa.26 According to a newspaper report,2 7
there are 300 American companies with direct investment of about
R690 million in the Republic of South Africa. These firms provide
employment for 250,000 non-White workers. 28 Other American
companies that have reacted positively to the need for change include
the Coca-Cola Company, which is reported to have a team of Black
salesmen earning the same basic salaries as Whites, and Lilly
Laboratories, an American-owned pharmaceutical company in which
some skilled Black workers are reported to earn more than their White
workmates. Among the largest of the American companies operating
in South Africa is General Motors, with 2,327 non-White employees.
Mr. Richard Gerstenberg, the company chairman, is reported to have
said after his visit to South Africa that Black and Colored employees
of his South African company had received substantial increases in
wages (averaging 33 per cent in the past year), that seven non-Whites
had been appointed to salaried positions, and that 140 were presently
on training schemes within the company, which would make it
possible to upgrade their status.29

24. Id. at 261.
25. Id. at 289.
26. D. Homer, United States Corporate Investment and Social Change in

South Africa (published by South African Institute of Race Relations) (for
restricted distribution only) (May, 1972).
27. Business Times of the Johannesburg Sunday Times, Sept. 17, 1972.
28. The term non-White in South Africa is used to denote both Blacks and
Coloreds, who are persons of mixed Black-White descent.
29. Johannesburg Star, April 15, 1972.
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IV.

AN EVALUATION OF THE EXPERIMENT

The increases in Black wages and the donations to educational
trusts discussed above have benefited a number of Blacks in South
Africa, but two questions must be asked in assessing the value of the
Polaroid Experiment: (i) Are the wage increases sufficiently substantial? (ii) Has the example of American companies led to a general
increase in Black wages in the Republic?
It is this writer's opinion that while there have been some increases
in wages due directly or indirectly to the Polaroid Experiment, these
increases have often been insufficient to raise the standard of living of
Black industrial workers beyond the barest subsistence level. It should
be kept in mind that according to the annual report of the South
African Reserve Bank, the annual rate of increase of the consumer
price index accelerated considerably during 1971. The increase from
June of 1970 to June of 1971 was 6.1 per cent. Food prices increased
by 4.7 per cent, and it is generally accepted that Black families are
hardest hit by such increases, as they spend proportionately more on
food than do White families. American parent companies cannot,
therefore, be satisfied with wage increases for their Black employees
unless these increases are tied realistically to the PDL or, preferably,
to the MEL.
The second question that arises is whether there has been a general
improvement in Black industrial wages in the Republic as a result of
the Polaroid Experiment. While it can be argued that it is too soon to
evaluate the effects of the Polaroid Experiment when it is in only its
second year, it is of some value to examine national trends to see if
there are any signs of change in South African industry as a whole. In
1972 the Productivity and Wages Association, a South African
nonprofit organization that has as its aim the improvement of Black
wages and productivity, conducted a national survey of 1,086
companies with 188,233 Black employees.3 0 Survey returns were
obtained from 13 per cent of the companies asked to participate, and
it is likely that the companies that gave returns were those that
provided optimum conditions for Black employees in terms of wages
and working conditions. The survey showed that 80 per cent of Black
employees earn less than R70 per month (the lowest of the PDL
figures already quoted). It also showed that although Black wages have
increased by approximately ten per cent in the last year, about one
third of Black employees are still paid between R40-R45 per month.
Thirteen per cent of the sample earned more than the PDL (estimated
30. D. Horner, Major Wage Survey-A Fund of Information, RACE
TIONS NEWS,

RELA-

Sept., 1972, at 1.
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at the time of the survey at R70 per month) but less than the MEL
(estimated at R105 per month). Only seven per cent of the sample
earned more than the MEL. There is possibly some distortion of these
results because no distinction is made between male and female
employees and some of the females might be secondary breadwinners,
but in general the survey shows Black wages to be deplorably low.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

An evaluation of the Polaroid Experiment in the South African
context indicates that the experiment has been successful in increasing
both wages and status of Black employees within Frank and Hirsch. A
number of other American companies operating in the Republic have
followed Polaroid's example, and there is a new sensitivity among
American, British and South African companies to the need for
further improvements in the wages and working conditions of Black
workers. There are at this time, however, no indications of changes of
a more general nature within South African industry. Inequalities
remain and without change in government policies only a small
proportion of the Black labor force can acquire skills. As long as the
exclusion of Blacks from effective union bargaining power remains a
feature of government policy, it is unlikely that enlightened companies operating in the Republic can bring about fundamental changes in
either working conditions or labor relations. Competition from
companies basing their costs on the lower wages will remain an
inhibiting force preventing an upward adjustment of scales of pay;
only if higher minimum wages are uniformly prescribed3" can the
problems of poverty become capable of general solution for all
workers.
The radical view heard with increasing frequency is that American
companies should disengage entirely from South Africa despite the
profitability of investment in the Republic.3 2 This approach has not
found favor with Black leaders in the Republic, who maintain that
economic boycotts of this kind inflict direct harm on Black workers.
They have on numerous occasions expressed publicly their preference
for American companies to remain in the Republic while proceeding
vigorously with fair employment practices. 3 3 A further point to be
31. It is important to note that governmental action is critical since the
Government is one of the largest employers of Black labor.
32. According to Adam the abundance of cheap labor in South Africa
allows a profit rate twice as high as the world average: roughly 15 to 20 per cent
annually between 1961 and 1965. H. ADAM, supra note 5, at 32.
33. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Bishop Zulu, and Mr. T. Moerane, editor of the
largest Black newspaper in the Republic, all are reported to have made statements
of this kind. Johannesburg Star, Sept. 28, 1972.
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noted is that economic boycotts of South Africa would harden White
attitudes and thus remove the possibility of American companies
exercising even limited influence on the South African system from
within. An American investment boycott of South Africa would also
create a vacuum that would inevitably be filled by foreign investors
from other countries. The possibility cannot be excluded that these
investors might have less awareness than their American counterparts
of the need for Black advancement in the Republic.
Today, informed observers in South Africa say that it is imperative
that Black workers be educated and be permitted to acquire the full
range of skills required in an industrialized society. The present
shortage of such skills is preventing the proper economic development
of the country, and White immigrants cannot contribute adequately to
reduce this shortage. If the Polaroid Experiment goes even a small way
toward showing how better wages and better conditions of employment improve productivity, and hence the wealth of the nation, it will
have been a valuable pointer to the need for a change in government
industrial relations policy.
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